We use data from 36 countries to examine how property rights affect loan spreads (over the London Interbank Offered Rate) in international bank loans. Banks charge higher loan spreads when property rights are weaker suggesting that recontracting and monitoring costs are larger in countries with weak property rights environments. The findings are robust to consideration of a large number of plausible macroeconomic and institutional factors. The findings are also robust to controlling for variation in observable risk characteristics of borrowers across countries. The effects are also economically large. If a country improved its property rights protection from the 33 rd percentile to the 67 th percentile, loan spreads would decline by 81 basis points.
Introduction
What affects cross-country variation in the costs of external financing? Despite a large literature that examines the effect of law and institutions on firm and stock market valuations, firm investments, and the use of external financing 1 , there is little direct evidence on whether cross-country variation in property rights affects costs of external financing. 2 The evidence that exists pertains mostly to bond and equity markets. This is surprising since international bank loans are every bit as important a source of financing as international bond markets and much more important than global equity markets.
Given the importance of banks in allocating credit to private firms in countries around the world, more attention to understanding what drives the cross-country variation in loan pricing is clearly warranted.
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This paper examines whether differences in property rights protection affect loan spreads (over the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)) in international bank loans. Property rights protection affects a lender's ability to recontract. Loan recontracting occurs when material deviations in the borrower's credit quality have occurred subsequent to initial 1 Recent research shows that secure property rights are associated with higher values of stock markets (La Porta et al. (1997) ); a higher number of listed firms (La Porta et al. (1997) ); higher valuation of listed firms relative to their assets (Classens et al. (2002 ), La Porta et al. (2002b ); greater use of external finance (LLSV 1997 (LLSV , 1998 (LLSV , 2000 ; and greater investments from external funds (Rajan and Zingales (1998) ; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) ). 2 An exception is a paper by Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002) , which shows that offering yields on Yankee bond issues by non-US firms are lower if issuers are located in countries with better protection of investor rights. Esty (2002) and Esty and Megginson (2003) provide indirect evidence. Esty (2002) examines how creditor rights protection and law enforcement affect the willingness of foreign banks to lend to domestic projects. Esty and Megginson (2003) examine how creditor rights protection and law enforcement affect the size and concentration of lending syndicates using a sample of internationally syndicated project loans. 3 See Figure 1 , which plots data on the relative importance of different forms of external financing in 49 countries. Bond and equity issuance data are from Thomson Financial and the loan data are from the Loan Pricing Corporation.
contracting. Banks typically respond to declining credit quality by raising interest rates, demanding more collateral, shortening loan maturity, and further restricting future activities.
An example illustrating the difficulty that lenders have in recontracting in weak property rights environments is provided by the recent case of Asia Pulp and Power (APP), controlled by Indonesia's Widjaja family. The company owes almost $14 billion to foreign banks, fund managers, and various credit agencies. The foreign banks lending to APP find it hard to reschedule debt payments. In addition, the Indonesian courts have not been very helpful in enforcing loan contracts. Bloomberg reported in April 2003 that the family snubbed the foreign lenders, often not turning up for scheduled meetings to discuss debt repayments.
Citing other examples from Indonesia, Bloomberg (April 28, 2003) states that "the lack of a credible legal infrastructure makes enforcing rights in Indonesia's courts almost impossible."
As the example illustrates, recontracting costs are likely to be higher when borrowers operate in countries with weak property rights protection. Lenders also bear the risk of contract repudiation. Thus, in weak property rights environments, banks are likely to require higher loan spreads to compensate for greater contracting risk.
We use data on loan spreads for bank loans in 36 countries to examine this prediction.
The analysis is conducted in two stages. The first part of the analysis focuses on estimating cross-country regressions in which the dependent variable is the loan spread. The key variable of interest on the right-hand side is an index of property rights protection. Countries with high levels of corruption, higher risk of expropriation, and greater uncertainty about contract enforcement are associated with poor property rights protection. The regressions control for other possible macroeconomic and institutional variables that may also affect loan spreads.
The second part of the analysis examines firm-level data in which we control for borrower characteristics and non-price loan terms. The first step in this analysis is to estimate loan spreads as a function of observable borrower risk characteristics at the firm level. We then take the country-level fixed effect estimates from this analysis and test if the property rights index helps to explain the cross-country variation in the country fixed effects. Thus, we examine the effect of property rights protection on loan spreads while controlling for variation in observable risk characteristics of borrowers across countries.
The results show that in countries with better property rights protection, lenders charge lower spreads on loans. Results are robust to controlling for several additional plausible institutional and macroeconomic factors. Results also hold up when firm-level heterogeneity in borrower risk characteristics is controlled. The benefit of better protection is enormous. By improving property rights protection from the 33 rd percentile to the 66 th percentile, a country can reduce the average spreads on loans to firms in that country by about 81 basis points.
Overall, the evidence suggests a clear and economically significant decline in the cost of external bank financing when property rights protection improves.
The findings have implications for the literature that relates legal and financial systems to a firm's ability to obtain external capital to fund growth. If firms in countries with secure
property rights obtain lower-cost bank financing, they are likely to make more investments financed by external financing sources and attain faster growth. Besley (1995 ), Mauro (1995 , Levine (1999) , Levine et al. (2000) , and Acemoglu et al. (2001) . Cross-country research also attempts to establish the causality from financial development to country growth rates. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that, in countries with well-developed financial systems, the industries with greater external financing requirements grow relatively faster. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998, 1999) show that better investor protection makes it more likely that a firm will make greater use of external financing and it will be less constrained in making productive investments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our data and variables. Section 3 gives the summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the main empirical results. Section 5 presents the firm-level evidence. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Data and variables

Description of the loan database
The bank loan data are from the Dealscan database, which is assembled and marketed by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC). It includes information on loan spreads, loan maturities, and facility sizes for a large sample of loans in countries around the world. While several recent studies examine US loan transactions using Dealscan, the international data are relatively unexplored. We exclude loans to entities other than corporations. Similarly, we exclude loans by lender other than banks. We also restrict our sample to bank lines of credit and term loans and exclude other instruments such as banker's acceptances, guarantees, and acquisition facilities. Finally, we exclude non-US dollar denominated loans. We exclude loans offered before 1994 because reporting on loans in the database is less complete before 1994.
A majority of the loans are syndicated while some involve sole lenders. All of the loans are priced as spreads over LIBOR. The focus of the analysis is on the drawn all-in spread, which equals the coupon spread (over LIBOR) plus the annual fee plus the upfront fee/maturity. We also obtain loan maturities from the database. Loan maturity is defined as the difference between the loan origination date and loan maturity date. The loan amounts (in US dollars) are converted into constant 1994 dollars using the CPI indexes for the countries in our sample.
Based on the identities of lenders and borrowers in the database, we cross-tabulate the aggregate loans by lender and borrower country. This cross-tabulation is reported in Appendix 
Measuring property rights protection
To measure the extent to which a country respects private property rights, we focus on three indexes from La Porta et al. (1998) . These three indexes measure corruption, the risk of expropriation of private property, and the risk that contracts may be repudiated. The range for each index is between zero and ten with low values indicating less respect for private property.
Following Morck et al. (2000), we combine these three indexes into an additive index of property rights protection. The index measures the extent to which a country's legal systems and institutions enforce all contracts, including government contracts.
To check if differences in bank loan contracts are associated with differences in the specific provisions of each country's commercial laws, we include a creditor rights index in our analyses, also obtained from La Porta et al. (1998 Finally, the regressions also control for the sovereign risk rating of the country and the natural logarithm of GNP per capita. The Standard and Poor's sovereign credit ratings are included to control for differences in sovereign risks of the nationality of the borrowers. The sovereign ratings affect the average risk of borrowers in a country. We assign a numerical score to the credit rating of each country thus converting AAA ratings to a score of 1 and B rating to a score of 15. We include natural log of GNP per capita because, according to La Porta et al. (1998) , creditor rights are stronger in poorer countries than in richer countries, but richer countries have a higher quality of law enforcement. The cross-country macroeconomic data are from the World Development Indicators database and the sovereign credit ratings are from Cantor and Packer (1997) . In addition to these control variables, we conduct sensitivity tests by including a number of other variables that measure banking sector characteristics and financial intermediary development in the countries in the sample. These variables are described in Section 4.1. Panel B presents summary data on loan spreads for countries stratified by the property rights index. These data suggest that loan spreads are indeed higher in countries with poor property rights protection. The median loan spreads are about 175 basis points for countries in the bottom third in terms of property rights protection. They decline to 70 basis points for countries in the middle third in terms of property rights protection and decline further to about 31 basis points for countries in the top third. Figure 2 , which plots the median loan spread and the property rights index for 36 countries in our sample, conveys the basic message -banks charge lower spreads to firms in countries with more secure property rights.
Descriptive statistics
Panel B of Table 1 also shows that loan sizes become larger as property rights become stronger and loan maturities become longer as property rights strengthen. Table 2 The correlation matrix also reveals interesting relations between institutional and macroeconomic variables. The property rights index and sovereign risk rating variable are negatively correlated, suggesting that sovereign risk ratings are higher when property rights are stronger. Also, the property rights index and per capita GNP are positively correlated.
Since per capita GNP is a broad indicator of the differences in wealth in each country, the data suggest that richer countries are perhaps better at law enforcement. It is therefore important to control for per capita GNP in loan spread regressions. Property rights are more secure in countries that have a Scandinavian legal tradition and are less secure in countries that use the French civil law tradition. Property rights are stronger in Protestant countries and in countries where English is the primary language.
The overall message from Table 2 is consistent with the descriptive statistics reported earlier. The correlations confirm that better property rights protection results in lower loan spreads.
Regression results
We begin our empirical analysis by estimating cross-country regressions that examine if differences in loan spreads are accounted for by cross-country differences in property rights protection, while controlling for other factors that may also affect loan terms. Table 3 presents results from regressions on the cross-country data. The dependent variable is the log of the country median loan spreads for bank loans in the sample countries.
Property rights protection and loan spreads
While we report results for regression specifications in which both the dependent and independent variables are the median values for each country, results are similar when we use country means instead of medians.
The regression specification in Column (1) includes the property rights index, creditor rights index, sovereign risk ratings, the English language dummy and the religion dummy as independent variables. These results show that the property rights index variable is negative and significant at the 5 percent level. 6 The negative relation between loan spreads and the strength of property rights protection supports the view that property rights protection allows more efficient contracting and that bank lenders charge lower spreads on loans to borrowers in countries where property rights protection is strong. Together, the variables included in Column (1) explain about 59 percent of the variation in the cross-country loan spreads. We also examine how the individual components of property rights index affect cross-country variation in loan spreads. Results reported in Columns (5) to (7) show that loan spreads when a country has more corruption and when risk of contract repudiation is greater. The coefficient on risk of expropriation is also negative but it is not statistically significant at conventional levels.
The results show no relation between creditor rights protection and loan spreads. In
Column (2), we augment the regression in Column (1) with the log of GNP per capita. While the coefficient on property rights index is still negative and significant, the coefficient on creditor rights index remains insignificantly different from zero. Column (3), which explores the relation between loan spreads and creditor rights index in a specification that excludes
property rights protection, also shows insignificant coefficient on the creditor rights index.
The fact that the creditor rights index does not explain the cross-country variation in loan spreads supports the argument that what matters to bank lenders is not the actual law that provides creditor rights protection, but, instead, how the law is enforced. Enforcement is a function of property rights protection. Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) reach a similar conclusion. These authors argue that a direct statistical relation between the existence of creditor rights and financial contracts is not expected, because the "existence of rights may be necessary but not sufficient to make a financial contract enforceable". 7 To test this more directly, we include an interaction term between property rights index and creditor rights in Column (4). Both the creditor rights index and the interaction term have insignificant coefficient estimates.
The sovereign risk rating variable is a numeric variable with higher ratings reflecting worse credit. As expected the coefficient on sovereign risk rating variable is positive but it is not consistently significant. Similarly, the language dummy has a positive coefficient and the religion dummy has a negative coefficient, but both coefficients are not significantly different from zero.
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The estimated coefficients from Column (2) suggest that average bank loan spreads will decline by 81 basis points if the property rights index is changed from its value at the 33 rd 7 In a different context, Esty (2002) finds that creditor rights and property rights affect foreign bank participation in project loan syndicates. 8 It is possible that religion affects property rights protection and creditor rights but that it does not have any explanatory power for spreads beyond these variables.
percentile to its value at the 66 th percentile. 9 Thus, the effect is also economically significant. The overlap between the time period for our sample loans and the Asian currency crisis in the late 1990s causes concerns that these results may reflect the effect of the Asian crisis on loan spreads charged by foreign lenders in emerging markets. To address this concern, we reestimate the regression in Column (1) after excluding Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, the countries that were most severely hit by the currency crisis.
The results are robust to exclusion of these countries from our sample. The estimated coefficient on the property rights index variable is identical to that in Column (2). It is also significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
The remainder of this section is devoted to sensitivity tests that examine if there are other explanations for our results. A concern with cross-country analysis is that the regression may omit an important explanatory variable that is actually driving the result and that is highly correlated with property rights protection. To rule out several alternative explanations, we include other plausible institutional and macroeconomic factors and examine if including them reduces the significance of the coefficient on the property rights index. In particular, we focus on the legal origin dummies, country risk measures, measures of the structure of the 9 Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002) find similar evidence of an economically significant decline bond spreads in the Yankee bond market. They show that moving from a country with relatively weak creditor protections and legal systems (Mexico) to country that has relatively strong laws and enforcement (United Kingdom) reduces annual yield spread of Yankee bonds by 58 basis points.
banking sector in a country, and variables that measure the size and activity of debt and equity markets. These sensitivity tests reported in Table 4 rule out a large number of alternative explanations. Table 4 include a set of legal tradition dummies. None of the legal origin dummies are significant. We also examine the effect that including only the French legal origin dummy has on the coefficient of the property rights index in the baseline regression. French civil-law countries are considered weak in investor protection. However, these unreported results show that the conclusions are not sensitive to the set of legal origin dummies included in the regression. The French legal origin dummy remains insignificant while the property rights index remains negative and significant at the 5 percent level.
Legal origin dummies:
Inflation rates: Countries with high inflation rates are subject to greater political risks, as there is a greater likelihood that the government will introduce wage and price controls or tamper with indexes. Higher inflation rates can raise contracting costs for firms and their bank lenders. According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) , high and/or variable rates of inflation make it costly for investors and firms to enter into contracts. In Column (2), we therefore include the log of the average inflation rate during the sample period for the countries in our sample. The inflation rate variable has a positive and significant coefficient consistent with the argument that banks lending to firms in high inflation countries charge higher loan spreads. However, the property rights index continues to remain negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
GNP growth volatility:
To address concerns that per capita GNP or the sovereign risk rating does not adequately capture country risk, we include GNP growth volatility as an additional measure of country risk. GNP growth volatility is estimated as the standard deviation of the annual growth rate in GNP. The coefficient on the GNP growth rate volatility is positive but it is not significant at conventional levels. However, the inclusion of GNP growth volatility in Column (3) does not change our main results about the property rights index.
Share of bank loans in aggregate external financing:
To control for the importance of bank loans in supplying external financing in a country, we estimate the share of bank loans in aggregate external financing during the sample period and include it as an additional variable in the baseline specification. One would predict that if banks provide the bulk of the financing with little competition from public debt and equity markets, loan spreads might be higher in that country. The results reported in Column (4) show that indeed the bank loan share variable is positive and significant. More importantly, including this variable does not alter our conclusions about the effect of property rights protection on loan spreads.
Restrictions on non-banking activities:
Another measure of the market structure of the banking sector is the ability of domestic banks in a country to engage in the business of underwriting, insurance, and real estate and of the regulatory effectiveness of banks to own shares in non-financial firms. Barth et al. (2003) examine the extent to which each country's regulations restrict a commercial bank's ability to engage in (i) securities underwriting, brokering and dealing, (ii) insurance underwriting and selling, (iii) real estate investment, development and management, and (iv) ownership of nonfinancial firms. They rate the degree of regulatory restrictiveness for each activity on a scale of 1 to 4. The overall measure of restrictiveness is the sum of these ratings. Barth et al. (2003) argue that fewer regulatory restrictions on the activities of commercial banks produce more efficient and more stable banking systems. They find that countries with regulatory environments that inhibit banks from engaging in the securities business tend to have more fragile financial systems. We therefore include their restrictiveness measure as an additional variable in the baseline regression.
The results show that differences in banking restrictions across countries do not explain the cross-country variation in loan spreads. More importantly, the property rights index remains significant and negative at the 1 percent level with the inclusion of variables that capture the restrictions on banking activities.
Government ownership of banks:
We also examine if controlling for government ownership of banks affects the relation between property rights protection and loan spreads.
La Porta et al. (2002c) argue that greater government ownership creates distortions and leads to misallocation of resources. On the other hand, proponents of the government ownership of banks maintain that government ownership overcomes informational problems and better directs capital to more productive projects. In either case, the presence of state-owned banks could affect the terms at which international banks lend to firms in an economy. We therefore include a variable that measures the degree of government ownership of banks, calculated as the fraction of the banking system's assets in banks that are 50 percent or more government owned. The data are taken from Barth et al. (2003) . The coefficient on state ownership is negative but it is not significant. Importantly, the coefficient on the property rights index is once again negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
Foreign bank ownership:
We include measures of foreign bank ownership since the presence of foreign banks reflects more integration with outside capital markets. We therefore include a variable that measures the fraction of the banking system's assets that are 50 percent or more foreign owned (Barth et al. (2003) ). This variable is insignificant but the property rights index variable continues to remain negative and significant at the 10 percent level. We include two other measures of foreign bank penetration from Beck et al. (1999) . One is the foreign bank share (number), which equals the number of foreign banks in the total banks, and the other is the foreign bank share (assets), which equals the share of foreign bank assets in the total banking sector assets. Both of these variables are insignificant and inclusion of these variables does not affect the sign and significance of other variables in the regression.
Credit provided by financial intermediaries to the private sector: This variable measures the financial development of an economy. Private credit by banks to the GDP ratio is from a database constructed by Beck et al. (1999) . In addition, we examine the liquid liabilities of the financial system relative to GDP and the ratio of commercial bank domestic assets to commercial and central bank domestic assets. These variables also measure the importance of the banking sector, in particular the financial depth and the overall size of the financial sector.
In all of these cases, our main results remain robust. These variables do not themselves have statistically significant effects on loan spreads when included in the regression with the property rights index, which is the most significant variable.
Size of the stock market. Finally, we examine the stock market total value traded to GDP and include it as a control variable to our baseline regressions. Our results on the importance of the property rights index are robust to controlling for the importance of the stock market in the economy. In addition, our results are robust to the inclusion of variables that measure the size of the bond markets and the size of the primary equity markets.
These sensitivity tests show that our results on the relation between property rights protection and loan spreads are robust to a large number of alternative measures of size, structure and activity of the financial intermediaries.
Further tests 4.2.1 Loan maturity, property rights protection, and loan spreads
The results in Section 4.1 suggest that loan spreads are higher when property rights protection is weak. These results are consistent with banks facing significantly greater recontracting risk when they are lending to firms in countries with poor protection of property rights. In response, banks charge higher loan spreads. However, banks also can shorten the contractual maturity of loans. Short-term loans allow creditors to review their lending decisions more frequently and, if necessary, to change the terms of financing. Bank lenders can refuse to renew a loan that has reached its maturity. In addition, short-term financing restricts the flexibility borrowers have to expropriate their creditors (Diamond (1991 (Diamond ( , 1993 ).
Consistent with these predictions, we show in Panel B of Table 1 that loan maturities are longer when banks lend to firms operating in countries with strong property rights.
Thus, it is important to examine if the relation between property rights protection and loan spreads continues to hold for loans with similar maturities across countries. With this in mind, we classify the loan sample into three maturity categories -(i) loans maturing in less than 3 years, (ii) loans maturing between 3 and 5 years, and (iii) loans maturing after 5 years. We then collapse the sample at the country level and regress the country median loan spreads on the sovereign risk rating, the log of GNP per capita, the property rights index, creditor rights, and the language and religion dummies for each of the three loan maturity categories. The results reported in Table 5 show that loan spreads are negatively related to the property rights index for all three loan maturity categories.
Country level regressions by year
We now examine the country level regressions by year to examine the robustness of our results. While the institutional variables such as the property rights index are invariant over time, the loan spreads do change from year to year. Thus, we compute country median loan spreads each year. The log of annual country median loan spreads is then regressed on institutional and macro-factors described earlier. The results presented in Table 6 show that with the exception of 1994, the cross-country variation in median loan spreads each year can be explained by the cross-country variation in property rights protection. Finally, Column (7) of Table 6 presents results from a panel regression where the dependent variable is the annual country median loan spread and the independent variables are the property rights index, creditor rights, sovereign risk rating, language and religion dummy, and log of GNP per capita.
The regression also includes year dummies. The results once again show that property rights protection negatively affects yield spreads.
Firm-level analysis
This section examines firm-level evidence on the effect of property rights protection on loan spreads. While the country-level results reported in the previous section are robust to the inclusion of several plausible additional institutional and economic variables, unobserved heterogeneity in borrower risk characteristics may still exist across countries. Borrower characteristics, such as firm size, leverage, profitability, and the nature of assets, may vary systematically across countries.
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Analysis at the firm level allows us to control for borrower characteristics and non-price loan terms. Our empirical strategy is as follows. In the first step, we estimate loan spreads as a function of observable borrower risk characteristics and non-price loan terms. We then take the country-level fixed-effect estimates from this analysis and test if the property rights index helps explain the cross-country variation in country residuals.
Since the LPC database does not provide data on borrower characteristics, we match (by hand) loan transactions to borrower characteristics included in the Worldscope database. The firm-level sample consists of 5,100 loans during the period 1994-1999 spanning 25 countries.
While we have fewer countries represented in this matched sample -25 rather than 36 in the country-level analysis -the benefit is that we have a much larger sample and there is a greater variation in the types of firms in each country.
Appendix 2 provides descriptive statistics on the matched loan and firm data.
Profitability is the ratio of net income plus depreciation divided by total assets. Debt-tomarket capitalization is the ratio of total debt divided by debt plus the market value of equity.
The market-to-book assets ratio is the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Loan spread, loan maturity and loan size are loan characteristics from the Loan Pricing 10 See Kumar et al. (2001) for the evidence on systematic variation in firm size across countries.
Corporation's database.
We begin our investigation with firm-level regressions of the log of loan spreads on firmspecific variables and year and country dummies. The dependent variable is the natural log of basis points above the LIBOR charged on the loan. To control for the observable risk of the borrower in regressions determining the loan rate, we include firm size, profitability, leverage, investment intensity, the market-to-book assets ratio, and the intangible-asset-to-total-asset ratio.
We include firm size because asymmetric information problems are less severe in large firms than in small firms. Large firms are more likely to be followed by multiple analysts and are more visible. Firm size is measured as the log of real assets. We include a measure of a firm's profitability since more profitable firms have lower default risk. Profitability also affects moral hazard problems and consequently loan spreads. We include leverage because it proxies for default risk and the severity of moral hazard problems (Myers (1977) ).
We include two proxies for future growth potential -investment intensity and the market-to-book assets ratio. Since managers find it more difficult to communicate credible information about growth opportunities to lenders than they do information about assets already in place, we expect adverse selection costs to be greater in growth firms. Finally, we include intangible intensity because firms with more intangible assets have a greater ability to shift wealth from creditors.
The regression results reported in Column (1) show that the firm characteristics have the predicted sign. Both firm size and profitability are negatively related to spreads suggesting that larger and more profitable firms borrow at lower interest rates. More levered firms pay higher spreads suggesting that lenders are concerned about default risk when lending to firms with high debt ratios. Growth opportunities and intangible intensity positively affect loan spreads suggesting that moral hazard problems are more severe when a firm's assets largely consist of growth options.
The regression in Column (2) includes two additional nonprice loan characteristicsloan maturity and loan size. Loan maturity is included because longer maturity loans exacerbate moral hazard problems. Short-term loans allow creditors to review their lending decisions more frequently and, if necessary, to change the terms of financing. Short-term financing also restricts the flexibility borrowers have in expropriating creditors (Diamond (1991 (Diamond ( , 1993 ). We therefore predict a positive coefficient on loan maturity. The prediction on the loan size variable is ambiguous. While larger loans increase a bank's exposure to the firm, they are also more likely to be made to better borrowers. The firm-specific variables and country dummies together explain between 52 and 54 percent of the variation in loan spreads.
The country fixed effect estimates reported in Columns (1) and (2) are useful because each estimate is an average, for a given country, of the loan spread that is left unexplained by firm and loan characteristics. We can therefore examine whether the property rights index can explain the variation in these country residuals. The results show that the property rights index is negatively related to the country residual on the loan spreads. The coefficient is also statistically significant at the 5 percent level or better. The country-level variables in Column (4) fully explain about 71 percent of the variation in country residuals.
The results based on this two-step procedure suggest that the effect of the property rights index on the cost of bank loan financing is robust to firm-level heterogeneity in borrower risk characteristics. Together, the findings reported in the previous and the current sections convey an important policy message. Bank lenders charge significantly higher interest rates when they lend to firms in countries with less secure property rights. Thus, a country can reduce the cost of external financing for its firms by improving the level of property rights protection at the country level. The reduction in the cost of external financing associated with better protection of property rights is economically large.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate how the protection of property rights affects bank loan spreads. Some countries provide stronger protection for private property rights than do other countries. The rights that lenders have are likely to be better enforced in countries with stronger protection of property rights. We ask if cross-country differences in property rights protection affect bank loan spreads.
The findings suggest that differences in property rights protection translate into large differences in loan pricing between firms and their lenders. In countries that provide weak property rights protection, loan spreads are larger. To test the robustness of these results, we also control for heterogeneity in borrower risk characteristics using firm-level regressions. We find that the property rights index is significantly related to loan spreads even after controlling for firm-level differences in borrower risk characteristics.
These results imply that by improving property rights protection, a country can expect to see a large reduction in its cost of external financing. While we are not the first to reach this conclusion, our evidence is more direct and it is based on a cross-country sample of actual loan transactions. Table 3   12  15  18  21  24  27 30 Property Rights Index Note.− Panel A presents country loan spreads, loan maturities, loan sizes, and the property rights index for 36 countries included in the sample. The total number of loans across all countries equal 24,817. The loan spread, maturity, and real loan size are median values for each country over the period 1994-1999. The property rights index is the sum of three indexes from La Porta et al. (1998) . Each index ranges from zero to ten. Each index measures government corruption, the risk of expropriation by the government, and the risk of the government repudiating contracts. High values of property rights indexes indicate better protection of property rights. Panel B presents summary statistics of country median loan spreads (in basis points), country median loan maturities, and country median loan sizes for countries with weak, medium, and strong property rights protection. Table 6 Country level regressions of loan spread by year Note.− This table presents results from country fixed-effect regressions of the natural log of loan spreads on firm and loan characteristics. The sample includes 5,100 loan transactions from 25 countries. The dependent variable is the natural log of loan spreads. Independent variables include borrowing firm's log of total assets, the profitability ratio (net income plus depreciation divided by total assets), leverage (total debt divided by market capitalization), the capital-expenditure-to-assets ratio, the market-to-book assets ratio, and the intangible assets ratio (intangible assets divided by total assets). The regression specification in column (2) also includes log of loan maturity and log of loan size. Both specifications include country dummy variables and year dummy variables.
*** Table 8 Country fixed-effect estimates of loan spreads as a function of property rights protection Country fixed effects from Model (1) of Table 7 Country fixed effects from Model (2) of Profitability is defined as the ratio of net income plus depreciation divided by total assets. Debt-to-market capitalization is defined as the ratio of total debt divided by debt plus market value of equity. The market-to-book assets ratio is defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. The capital-expenditure-toassets ratio is the capital expenditures divided by total assets. The intangible-to-total-assets ratio is defined as the ratio of intangibles to total assets.
